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For quite a while a fresh headwind blew from Latin America through a world gone 
mad. Following decades of neoliberal restructuring the tide seemed to turn with the new 
millennium. Country after country elected left leaning governments ranging from moderate 
left in countries like Argentina and Brazil or Chile to more radical Bolivarian left in countries 
such as Venezuela, Bolivia or Ecuador (see Cannon, 2016 pp. 99, 100 for an overview). 
Quickly dubbed the pink tide in Western academia, governments embraced social policy 
agendas requiring tax increases on commodity exports and resource extraction and a new 
emphasis on regulatory intervention in the moderate countries, and nationalizations and more 
far reaching efforts of state led restructuring in the Bolivarian nations (see Chador‟s 2015 
comparison of Brazil and Venezuela). Beyond the national level, some countries strengthened 
the resolve to resist the dominant neighbor in the North and the global financial institutions. 
Led by Venezuela and Cuba, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) 
was founded in 2004. Due to the windfall of rising commodity prices during the first decade 
of the new millennium, oil rich Venezuela was able to assist Argentina escaping from IMF 
conditionality, for example. In 2009, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Ecuador, Bolivia 
and Venezuela decided to found the Banco del Sur in order to create an alternative to the U.S. 
dominated international financial institutions, though this effort to institutionalize South–
South financial cooperation was put on hold. Drawbacks like this and attempted coups in 
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Venezuela (2002), Bolivia (2008), Honduras (2009) and Ecuador (2010) notwithstanding, the 
pink tide has also been discussed as “post-neoliberalism”. 
The definition of the term remained vague, used interchangeably as a normative, 
descriptive or a heuristic concept. Emir Sader, for example, sometimes equated post-
neoliberalism with “anti-neoliberalism” (Sader, 2009, p. 174), and sometimes he used the 
term as a descriptive category. Post-neoliberalism then appears as “hybrid solutions” of 
“hybrid social forces” in search of alternatives (Sader, 2008, p. 29, p. 81). While Brazil and 
Uruguay remained within the old model, tempering it with compensatory social policies, the 
general secretary of the Latin American Council of Social Sciences (CLACSO) saw 
Venezuela, Argentina and the Andean nations on the way to construct a viable alternative. It 
almost appears that left-wing intellectuals like Sader and Atilio Boron (2003) used the idea as 
a political means to strengthen actors, discourses and policies that reject and move beyond the 
neoliberal model. Similarly, Grugel and Riggirozzi defined post-neoliberalism as “a call for a 
new kind of politics, rooted in, and responsive to, local traditions and communities and an 
attempt to forge a new pact between society and the state” (Grugel and Riggirozzi, 2012, p. 
3). 
Contrary to the prefix “post” not all scholars using it want to suggest the era of 
neoliberalism is over and done with. At a CEDLA workshop in 2008, entitled “Post-
neoliberalism – change or continuity”, the speakers were much more cautious in their 
assessments. After carefully explaining neoliberal restructuring in different areas, they 
pointed to obstacles for a structural and institutional change, i.e. vested interests, transnational 
capital and the international environment (CEDLA, 2009). In a similar vein, Claudio Katz 
(2015) stated that the concept of post-neoliberalism overlooks the persistence of the economic 
model generated during the previous decades. Beatriz Stolowicz even warned of a use of the 
term. For her it is nothing more than a means to conceal capital interests (see Stolowicz, 2016, 
vol. 2 for a discussion of new varieties of social market economy, social liberalism and social 
rule of law in Chile, México and Columbia, respectively). 
  Brand and Sekler (2009) in turn distinguished between three analytical levels of 
neoliberalism: firstly, its intellectual-ideological dimension; secondly, strategic elites 
attacking the (peripheral) “Fordist” compromises of the period of import substituting 
industrialization, and, thirdly, sometimes quite incoherent social practices. The third 
dimension  
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“…is the starting point for our considerations of the term postneoliberalism, the 
intention being to discuss different responses to the (negative) impacts of 
neoliberalism and its growing inability to deal with the upcoming contradictions and 
crises. Thus the focus is not on the question of whether a new, postneoliberal era in 
general has begun and what might be the criteria supporting or contesting such an 
assessment. Rather, we propose to consider postneoliberalism as a perspective on 
social, political and/or economic transformations, on shifting terrains of social 
struggles and compromises, taking place on different scales, in various contexts and 
by different actors” (Brand and Sekler, 2009, p. 6, italics in the original). 
 
 
   Contrary to an apparently quite coherent and unambiguous ideological and political 
project of neoliberalism, the authors thus identify a lot of space for variation and 
differentiation in the event of crises resulting from neoliberal restructuring on the one hand, 
and a surprisingly strong anti-neoliberal commonality in the DNA of opposition forces. 
 
“All postneoliberal approaches have in common that they break with some specific 
aspect of „neoliberalism‟ and embrace different aspects of a possible 
postneoliberalism, but these approaches vary in depth, complexity and scope, as well 
as everyday practices and comprehensive concepts” (ibid., p. 6).  
 
 
  Although the general historical understanding of society as a result of social struggle 
can certainly be appreciated, there are a few issues with perspectives such as the one of Brand 
and Sekler or Grugel and Riggirozzi. Firstly, it is difficult to read post-neoliberalism and yet 
to suggest it is not supposed to mean neoliberalism has become a constellation of the past. 
Secondly, on closer inspection, neither the intellectual-ideological dimension of neoliberalism 
is clear-cut nor is there just one overarching political elite project. Thirdly, if the range of 
neoliberal core concepts and key programs are not detailed, it is very difficult to judge the 
extent to which ideas and orientations of progressive or left-leaning governments can be 
considered in opposition to neoliberalism.
3
 Contrary to the widespread equation of 
neoliberalism and market fundamentalism it is important to acknowledge the dual 
confrontations that stand at the cradle of neoliberalism: the recognition of the need to 
                                                          
3
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neoliberalism according to some fixed essentials (compare Plehwe 2009).  
 
Revista de Estudos e Pesquisas sobre as Américas V.13 N.2 2019 ISSN: 1984-1639 
 
169 
overcome laissez faire ideas prevalent in traditional economic liberalism and the need to 
constructively oppose what have been summarily labelled collectivist approaches. 
Neoliberalism is a theoretical perspective based on common principles and shared norms 
undergirding a form of social rule. Policy characteristic of neoliberalism include privatization, 
entrepreneurial freedom, cuts in public expenditure, deregulation of labor markets, and trade 
and foreign investments liberalization. These policies have been accommodated in quite 
diverse political systems and in a flexible way. Social minimum standards, for instance, are 
held to be compatible with neoliberalism if welfare schemes are designed in ways “not 
inimical to initiative and the functioning of the market “(Statement of Aims, Mont Pèlerin 
Society 1947). More fundamentally, neoliberalism differs from the laissez-faire liberalism of 
the 19
th
 century by maintaining that some degree of governmental oversight was a sine qua 
non of contemporary capitalism. Parallel to the recognition of the need to secure capitalist 
ownership and market relations at the national level, neoliberals recognized the need to 
construct and fortify an international order conducive to capitalist “free market societies”.  
Such international alliances, institutions, rules and ordering techniques are needed to regulate 
trade and international investment in civil ways on the one hand. But they also serve to 
constrain competing economic systems and they can serve to impose market friendly regimes 
by way of military force. Cutting edge research on the Geneva school of neoliberals has shed 
new light on the history of neoliberal efforts to encase market economic order at the 
international level (Slobodian, 2018). If central neoliberal ideas like rule of law privileging 
property owners and primacy of market transactions both within and across borders (free trade 
treaties with Western powers), targeted social policies (conditional cash transfers), export 
orientation and concessions to transnational companies are shared by center-left governments, 
a declaration of post-neoliberalism based on government change and electoral politics can be 
clearly misleading. Rather than assuming the continuing validity of the traditional and 
comprehensive left-right distinction of parties, many scholars ask if, in which ways and why 
progressive governments continued with important tenets of neoliberalism (see, for example, 
Morais and Saad-Filho, 2005; Féliz, 2011; Veltmeyer and Petras, 2014, compare Ruckert, 
MacDonald and Proulx, 2017 for a detailed account of continuities in most countries and 
significant departures in a few countries only). In other words: how much neoliberal 
endurance is hidden by government change?  
  In his study of neoliberal hegemony in Latin America and the challenge from the 
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pink tide, Chodor (2015) distinguishes between a real challenge emanating from Venezuela 
and the Bolivarian perspective compared to what he described as a passive revolution in 
Brazil in reference to Gramsci‟s notion for the adaptation of peripheral countries to the 
hegemonic projects of the core. Contrary to a notion of united colors of anti-neoliberalism 
Chodor suggests thinking of the pink tide as a “contested phenomenon” (Chodor, 2015, p. 
147). Chador‟s contrast of Chavez‟s Bolivarian restructuring efforts and Lula and Rousseff‟s 
neostructuralism (or neo-developmentalism) combined with constrained social reformism 
provides rich details of different trajectories instead of conflating all center-left and left 
governments in a common anti-neoliberal bandwagon. While he also considered the 
interaction between the different projects as an important dimension of a possible evolution of 
a regional historical bloc in Latin America, he warned that even the Lula-Rousseff agenda and 
comparable projects in Chile of “globalization with a human face” operating in the framework 
of the “post-Washington-Consensus” do not need to generate continued support from the 
corporate sector (Chodor, 2015, pp. 179-180). When Hernán Ramírez scanned the neoliberal 
think tank networks in Brazil in August 2018, he was confident to observe “certain 
exhaustion” (Ramírez, 2018, p. 17). Public policies promoted after the removal of Dilma 
Rousseff were “showing signs of failure” (ibid. p. 17) according to the author, and Lula‟s 
popularity was strong. In spite of his deep insight in the far-flung neoliberal civil society 
networks that have been developed in Brazil in three waves since the 1960s, the author quite 
evidently underestimated both the resolve and the repertoire of action of the right (though, to 
be fair, many details of Bolsonaro‟s ascent to power were not yet in place (compare 
Anderson, 2019). 
  Fast forward 2019. The counter-wave of right wing forces has swept away pink tide 
governments in Argentina and Brazil, and the Maduro government of the strongest Bolivarian 
nation, Venezuela, is embattled in a bitter fight to stay in power facing domestic opposition 
ready to take the presidency, supported by a wide range of countries in Latin America, in 
North America and Europe. The oil rich country suffers from a steep decline in commodity 
prices, strangulating sanctions from the main oil customer in the North and more than subtle 
threats of external intervention and murder of the elected president. Brazil‟s new president 
Bolsonaro has used right wing populist language in opposition to climate change mitigation 
and gender equality similar to Donald Trump in the United States, and openly professes to 
authoritarian measures not only to curb crime and corruption, but also to reign into academic 
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freedom and the media. Much like Trump, Bolsonaro has professed to strongly support 
business, and restrain the power of trade unions and the workers‟ party. If there still are post-
neoliberal practices in Latin America in early 2019, the range and scope of such action 
appears to be severely circumscribed. Only Mexico, which was kept out of the pink wave, 
appears to once again experience an opposing trend with Andrés Manuel López Obrador 
succeeding to beat the center-right wing parties PRI and PAN on the third attempt with his 
new National Regeneration Movement.  
  In stark contrast to the fascination with the pink tide just a few years ago the 
literature is now replete with titles like “The resilience of the Latin American Right” (Luna 
and Kaltwasser, 2014), “The Right in Latin America” (Cannon, 2016) or “Crisis del 
posneoliberalismo y ascenso de la nueva derecha” (López Segrera, 2016). Already back in 
2011, Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser had pointed to a lack of attention to the right. The near 
exclusive focus on the turn to the left was mistaken because important countries like 
Columbia, Peru and Mexico were governed by right wing politicians in the 2000s, some 
countries turned right (e.g. Chile in 2009), and the strength of right wing parties in 
parliaments (in Brazil or Venezuela) received little attention.  
  Celebrating the pink tide, arguably even less attention was paid to the continuing 
strength of the right in corporate circles and civil society at large. Apart from the visible 
relevance of electoral cycles – a government change can hardly be considered the basis for the 
shift of an era in itself – the basis of the post-neoliberalism arguments needs to be addressed. 
If neoliberalism is considered a philosophical orientation and a political phenomenon only, 
social movements and political parties can be considered powerful enough to move a country 
rapidly towards and away from neoliberalism. If neoliberalism instead needs to be considered 
as a more profound structural transformation (of capitalism and society, with national and 
transnational dimensions, transformations that were and are informed by fundamental 
neoliberal norms and principled beliefs), the changes needed to move beyond neoliberalism 
have to run deeper. Political arguments relating fundamental change to political parties and 
electoral politics mainly will lead to a misinterpretation of the historical evolution of socio-
economic eras. Latin American interpreters that expected from pink tide governments a 
structural transformation in some way just followed the assertions of third way social 
democrats in Europe, who had claimed to end neoliberalism in the course of the 1990s only to 
take the neoliberal transformation of the welfare state a notch or two further by way of 
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extending neoliberal concepts to the unemployed (“activation”, self-responsibility, 
entrepreneurship etc.), for example. Electoral and government change can be a starting point 
for more profound change. But contrary to widespread hopes, pink tide governments did not 
or could not take anti-neoliberal projects very far in Latin America either. 
Political Sociology of the pink tide and the right 
 A major shortcoming in the pink tide debate with regard to changes in power 
constellations so far is a strong focus on electoral change and central government action, and 
a lack of attention to the diverse and deeper sources of power in society. Fortunately we can 
rely on approaches of political sociology like those advanced by German political scientist 
Wolfgang Abendroth and the British sociologist Michael Mann. The former grew up in the 
turmoil of the Weimar Republic, were democracy stood on fragile pillars due to the power of 
the right in the institutions and in the streets. The latter has developed a model of sources of 
power, which offers a rich repertoire to analyze strategies of the contemporary right in Latin 
America.  
Let us first tackle Wolfgang Abendroth to obtain a sufficiently broad view of political 
power. According to Abendroth, political science aims to examine the conditions of the 
genesis of political power, its institutions and effectiveness. The problem of political decision 
making is central. It is closely related to political theory because humans anticipate the results 
of their action in their head so to speak. So far, Abendroth seems to speak about the political 
and the ideological dimension of analysis. But in contrast to the general narrow understanding 
of politics, each social activity is considered political, which aims at changing or stabilizing 
the structure of society and the distribution of power between social groups. His 
understanding of political science thus is clearly not confined to decision making and the state 
narrowly conceived. The social scientific understanding is expressed by the adoption of the 
term political sociology. This approach is linked to political practice. It needs scholars to 
reflect in which ways the analysis supports particular practices or aims at changing them. 
Policy making is inevitably “controversial in essence since it serves either to maintain or to 
abolish rule” (Abendroth, 1967, p. 11). Such a perspective is highly skeptical with regard to 
the increasing differentiation of science and the emerging plethora of sub-disciplines since 
many important dimensions of the analysis are moved apart rather than being taken into 
consideration. An isolated discussion of elections and government constellations or social 
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practices appears to offer a good example of limited understanding. It is important to establish 
which structures of society need to be addressed in order to tackle efforts that aim at 
stabilizing or changing the distribution of power. Michaels Mann‟s model of power offers 
exactly such an approach. 
  While Abendroth designed a general plow, Michael Mann‟s (1986) history of power 
supplies a set of finer tools, stick, shovel, rake and hoe maybe, to turn the ground for greater 
detail. His four sources of power emanate from economic relations, from military, from 
political institutions and, last but not least, from ideologies conceptualized in close proximity 
to organizations (like the Catholic Church, for example). Mann follows Weber in his 
analytical distinction of different spheres, but he also goes some way beyond Weber in his 
sophisticated understanding of ideology and ideological power, for example. While the 
economic, military and political sources of power are by and large contained in the nation 
state in his theory, Mann is explicit about the transnational dimension of ideological power 
(Mann, 1986, p. 23). He distinguishes what he calls a more autonomous form of ideology that 
is socio-spatially transcendent. This form transcends the other sources of power and creates 
social relations rather than serving merely to integrating and reflecting society. Mann refers to 
the major ideologies like Liberalism, Conservatism, Marxism, or Neoliberalism. The second 
dimension considered is an immanent morality related to a special social group. This 
dimension is more closely related to the social order of the (nation) state once again and 
allows specifying particular groups like British Conservatism, German Social Democracy or 
the peculiar ideological mix of the Brazilian Labor party.  
  The two dimensions co-exist, of course. Intellectual efforts of promoting post-
neoliberalism have been projected to the pink tide, for example, and have become immanent 
moralities of specific groups, with notable differences between a confrontational Bolivarian 
spirit and compromise(d) adaptations to neoliberal hegemony designed to get along with 
opposition forces. Beyond Weber‟s famous switchmen metaphor that acknowledged an 
important role of ideas in certain points in history, Michael Mann elaborated on a track laying 
function of ideas and norms suggesting a constant effort to generate and maintain a shaping 
role of ideology (Mann, 1986, pp. 341-372, 376-9). The track laying function obviously 
matters for all ideological forces, right or left. Those who have developed a capacity to build 
infrastructures in the realm of ideas, knowledge and expertise would appear to have a decisive 
advantage in social struggles that after all are always struggles over interpretation of social 
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situations, events and perspectives. In terms of neoliberalism studies in Latin America much 
like elsewhere, particular attention thus needs to be paid to the transnational source of 
ideological power, its various domestic expressions, and the more or less deeply entrenched 
track laying capacities. 
Fortunately, political sociology in general and Mann‟s model of power in particular 
did already inform important parts of the pink tide / postneoliberalism conversation and the 
return of the right. Luna and Kaltwasser (followed by López Segrera) distinguish between a 
non-electoral right which engages in interest representation via business organizations and 
think tanks, among others; an electoral right with a non-partisan strategy, and a right that is 
organized as a political party (Luna and Kaltwasser, 2014, pp.13-14; Kaltwasser, 2014, pp. 
42-45). Although it is said that these three vehicles for rightist action might be 
complementary, the categories seem too exclusionary. This becomes evident on the example 
of Mauricio Macri in Argentina. He is characterized as an example of an electoral right based 
on a political party. His power base and political beginnings originated in a think tank 
(Pensar), however, and the formation of a political party (PRO) came later (Vommaro, 2014).  
Barry Cannon (2016) unfolds his study on the basis of Michael Mann`s history of 
power, providing us hitherto with the arguably strongest account of the Latin American 
contemporary situation. The next section will be devoted to critically engage Cannon. Based 
on Cannon‟s scrutiny of the different dimensions of social transformation and sources of 
power we will move beyond his important account afterwards in a section on transnational 
neoliberal think tank networks. Cannon missed most of this empirical material. Its 
consideration is necessary to throw new light on the interrelated areas of transnational civil 
society, ideology and state formation. Following the contested era of the pink tide, neoliberal 
forces have regained the upper hand and neoliberalism has taken a new breath of life in 
conjunction with social conservatives and aggressive neo-nationalists. 
Latin American sources of power of the right 
Michael Mann‟s work has strongly inspired Barry Cannon‟s approach to study the 
advance of the right in Latin America. Nonetheless Cannon suggests a need to go beyond 
Mann‟s allegedly nation state focused concepts of sources of power. Although this is clearly 
mistaken with regard to ideology given Mann‟s record of studying transnational dimensions 
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of ideological power, Cannon is actually quite right with regard to Mann‟s last book in the 
four volume series on the history of social power dealing with the second part of the twentieth 
Century and the rise of neoliberalism. While we might suggest that Cannon forgot to read 
Mann‟s discussion of the transnational dimension of ideology, this appears to be a lesser sin 
than Mann‟s apparent forgetfulness of his own concept in his writing on neoliberalism. While 
Cannon emphasizes the transnational dimension of ideology in general and one network of 
neoliberal political parties and think tanks in Latin America (RELIAL) in particular, Mann 
offers a surprisingly narrow, U.S. centered and at best Anglophone analysis of neoliberalism 
(Mann, 2013, pp. 130f), missing the far flung neoliberal networks of think tanks and 
intellectuals and the important track laying functions within and across borders that need to be 
detailed. 
  Beyond reclaiming the transnational dimension of ideology of the right in Latin 
America, Cannon also proposes to add a new fifth source of social power, namely the 
transnational dimension in terms of political and economic institutions such as trade 
agreements and regional integration projects. Apart from the Southern Common Market 
(Mercosur)
4
 and ALBA, which are efforts to strengthen South-South cooperation, many 
countries are partners in free trade agreements with the United States and four highly 
internationalized economies (Chile, Columbia, México and Peru) have formed the Pacific 
Alliance in 2011 to promote an ambitious free trade and liberalization agenda quite different 
from both Mercosur and ALBA (Cannon, 2016, pp. 83-85). 
  Operationalizing a general political sociology approach this way turns out to be 
highly productive. In order to establish the threat from the Left of the Pink Tide, Cannon 
establishes the key concerns of the neoliberal right wing forces in the area of economic, 
political, ideological, military relations and the transnational dimension mentioned above. The 
right wing bill of rights prominently highlights ownership of key economic sectors and 
market freedoms, control of the parliamentary system (polyarchic institutionality), media 
ownership, think tanks and liberal freedoms of the press, military alliances and trade 
agreements. Indicators of a serious threat from the pink tide left in the various fields include 
                                                          
4
 Founded at the heyday of neoliberalism in 1991, Mercosur was constructed as an export platform aiming at the 
integration of national economies into the international market. Between 2003 and 2014 the governments of 
Uruguay and Argentina tried to transform the trading bloc into a more development oriented economic 
community. Under the leitmotiv “integración productiva” (productive integration) they promoted manufacturing 
and South-South cooperation. 
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nationalization or increasing social control of economic sectors and market activities, election 
wins of left wing parties and reversals of liberal structures of democracy, increasing state and 
community ownership of the media, control of think tanks and limits to liberal media 
dominance, distancing from US policy priorities, presence or absence of free trade agreements 
with the United States. Cannon uses data provided by the neoliberal Economic Freedom 
Index, the Economist Intelligence Unit‟s Democracy Index, Freedom House Press Freedom 
Index, distribution of U.S. bases and FTAs as proxies (Cannon, 2016, p. 94). Although these 
indexes are partisan efforts to promote neoliberal and other agendas in support of capitalism 
and market-conforming versions of democracy and the media, the use of such measurements 
is smart as it allows looking at the countries from a neoliberal vanguard point. If countries are 
found to slip in the ranking based on the Economic Freedom Index, neoliberals clearly 
perceive of a threat to their cause, for example (Stanford, 1999; Ram, 2014). 
  Based on the empirical material generated this way, Cannon convincingly 
distinguishes three groups of countries in the economic dimension: conservative, centrist and 
left. With regard to the left, only a few Bolivarian countries and Argentina account for 
significant nationalization efforts. More than 80 percent of nationalization is in the oil and gas 
industries and Venezuela‟s nationalization of the heavy-oil field in the Orinoco Belt in 2007 
accounts for the major part of the activity (Cannon, 2016, p. 96); Argentina nationalized an 
energy company and private pension funds. Some countries and once again Bolivia, Ecuador 
and Venezuela additionally introduced prize controls and pursued other strategies to more 
effectively regulate economic exchange (exchange controls, land reform, support for 
cooperative sector etc.). Apart from Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela Brazil scored 
low in the Economic Freedom index due to a traditionally high involvement of the state in the 
economy. But “Venezuela poses the greatest threat, largely because of its oil wealth and its 
willingness to use this to subsidize and encourage such policy deviance in other countries…” 
(Cannon, 2016, p. 98). 
  In the realm of politics, the democratic challenge from left wing parties was directed 
at the traditional understanding of liberal (procedural) democracy. A stronger emphasis on 
popular participation relied on the executive to constrain traditional forms of (parliamentary 
and interest group) representation in some countries. Historically excluded populations were 
included, in respect of political and social rights. Constitutional reform through constituent 
assemblies occurred in many states; local-level participatory elements were introduced (see, 
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for example, Moreira, 2017 and Goldfrank, 2011). Because of the resulting restrictions of 
civil liberties of privileged strata and weakening of certain institutions, Bolivarian countries 
were classified as “hybrid democracies” exhibiting a mix of liberal and authoritarian elements 
according to the Democracy index (Cannon, 2016, p. 101).
5
 Many more countries simply 
maintained the traditional political system (and with it the centralist and presidential power 
structure) and posed a threat to the right because of policy continuity. Since many of the 
policies of the right were carried forward, there was little room for confrontation from the 
opposition. The relationship between the left and the right thus differs dramatically depending 
on the character of the left with regard to the political dimension (Nueva Sociedad, 2014).  
  With regard to the ideological dimension, the dual process of neoliberalism and 
democratization is important for the contemporary conflict constellation. Contrary to the 
earlier experience of authoritarian neoliberalism under military dictatorship, the 1980s 
“Washington Consensus” era ushered in a second phase of neoliberal development also 
supported by domestic political parties, coalitions and elites.  
“Crucial to the formation of these neoliberal polyarchies in the Latin 
American…region, were intense and continuous „democracy assistance‟ programmes. 
These programmes aimed at promoting and sustaining polyarchy as the preferred 
system of government throughout the hemisphere, and, less overtly, ensuring 
sufficient political and social stability for neoliberal market societies to survive and 
thrive” (Cannon, 2016, p. 102).  
 
 
These programs were carried out with funding from the United States, Canada and 
European states like Spain and Germany. Apart from resources from intelligence 
communities, money was channeled through development and democracy promotion agencies 
and philanthropic and political party foundations. “Of particular interest and utility,” writes 
Cannon, “are „think tanks‟ with their privileged access to state, political and media agents at a 
transnational, regional and national level” (Cannon, 2016, p. 103). Strategies aim at 
strengthening elite forces in political and social arenas and at undermining popular 
movements, at constructing “liberal citizens” and at keeping grassroots movements within the 
limits of polyarchic structures. Support for these efforts came from the media, which is 
                                                          
5
 In order o deal with the power struggles in such societies it is not useful to rely on categories like “liberal” or 
“authoritarian” without further ado due to their normative connotations (liberal = good, authoritarian = bad). 
Some of the groups that have been restricted by central government activities execute control over vast channels 
of influence, for example. Changes in government configurations thus need to be complemented by an analysis 
of the shift in social power relations within society. In order to reform democracy in Germany at the end of the 
19th Century, for example, the power of the Prussian gentry had to be curtailed. 
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strongly concentrated in private hands, elite controlled and heavily biased towards 
neoliberalism (ibid., p. 104). In this field much like in the economic and political dimension, 
only the Bolivarian countries made somewhat stronger efforts to counter private media by 
way of strengthening public media by way of supporting community media and by way of 
setting up Telesur at the regional level. In Argentina, the regulation of private media 
conglomerates spun them into fierce opponents of the government. Unsurprisingly, the media 
in Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia and Argentina were judged “partly free” by Freedom House, 
which is unconcerned by the issue of private media concentration. Although other countries 
like Columbia, Paraguay and Mexico received the same assessment, this was due to high 
levels of violent conflict in these countries, which was by and large absent in the former 
nations except for Venezuela.  
  The military discussion is most ambiguous since the war on drugs and its use to 
repress dissent and opposition has been subject to increasing criticism from a number of 
actors across the political spectrum. But a close relationship between economic and military 
cooperation can be observed. With the exception of Nicaragua, the ALBA countries do not 
have FTAs with the United States, nor do they have military bases. The same is true for Brazil 
and Argentina. 
  Last but not least, the transnational dimension. Brazil took the lead to set up the 
BRICS development bank in 2014. For this project in opposition to the global financial 
institutions Brazil joined forces with Russia, China, India and South Africa. As mentioned 
before, the parallel plan to set up Banco del Sur as a regional development bank for Latin 
America stalled in 2016. Mercosur admitted Venezuela as a new member in 2012. Brazil was 
instrumental in setting up UNASUR (Union of South American Nations) in 2008, 
complementing the Council for Latin America and the Caribbean (CELAC). CELAC itself 
was formed as a counter-weight to the Organization of American States headquartered in 
Washington, DC. The Bolivarian countries formed ALBA, committed explicitly to develop 
measures against neoliberal forms of regionalism. The alliance is devoted to supplying cheap 
oil, health and literacy programs. All these developments seem to indicate a reduction of U.S. 
influence in the region and “…the emergence of a new regional hegemony, at least in South 
America, centered on Brazil” (Cannon, 2016, p. 109). But Cannon does not fail to mention the 
counter-development of the Pacific Alliance, which is guided by the principles of open 
regionalism. Their members – Chile, Mexico, Columbia, and Peru – keep a distance from the 
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Bolivarian and Mercosur strategies and look for close relations with the United States. It is 
already clear that not much remains of the regional cooperation and Brazil centered hegemony 
as plans to merge Mercosur and the Pacific Alliance reveal (Tornaghi, 2018). The regional 
cooperation in the framework of UNASUR has also been challenged by the creation of the 
new Forum for the Progress of South America (PROSUR) by seven right wing South 
American presidents in March 2019. If there was a need to speak about the pink tide as a 
contested phenomenon, we now need to speak of the right wing counter tide as a phenomenon 
that will likely lead to an even higher degree of contestation with regard to regional 
cooperation, for example. 
The right-wing counter tide: basic strategies 
Based on this account, Cannon distinguished three counter-strategies developed by the 
right to meet the different challenges or threats emanating from the various center-left pink 
tide governments. He identifies electoral strategies, mobilizations beyond the electoral level in 
order to prepare the removal of left wing leaders from power (media campaigns targeting 
particular politicians, for example), and semi- or extra-constitutional strategies to oust 
political leaders, sometimes relying on the military (Cannon, 2016, pp. 118-9). Considering 
the three most important countries that have also presented (or still are presenting) the 
strongest threat to neoliberalism and elite control or polyarchic democracy in the region, 
Argentina, Brazil and Venezuela, we can easily see this distinction makes sense. Argentina‟s 
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner lost the elections to the right wing candidate Mauricio Macri 
in 2015 following the tax revolt of agribusiness against the increase of export taxes and 
middle class protest against foreign exchange restrictions. The impeachment of Dilma 
Rousseff followed on the heels of a massive mobilization of protest against moderate price 
hikes in public services, though the right wing media and political elites only jumped the 
bandwagon when they realized they had a chance to turn the protest against Rousseff and the 
PT. Ground was prepared by corruption investigations targeting a whole range of politicians, 
but the media focus was on the most popular target from the perspective of the neoliberal 
right: former president Lula. Last but not least, Venezuela‟s opposition leader Juan Guaidó 
declared himself president of the country in the hope the presidency of Nicolás Maduro would 
implode due to the impact of sanctions and popular unrest. Guaidó‟s move yielded a 
surprisingly quick and large amount of support from a number of European states in addition 
 
Revista de Estudos e Pesquisas sobre as Américas V.13 N.2 2019 ISSN: 1984-1639 
 
180 
to the United States and Canada. But the opposition leader still appears to have miscalculated 
the resolve of the army and the majority of the population which appear to stand by the 
Bolivarian project so far regardless of mounting pressure from outside and inside. Due to the 
turmoil in Venezuela, the Bolivarian project appears to be significantly weakened and in any 
case unlikely to expand beyond the small core of the ALBA countries. It has also become 
involved in the larger global conflict structures with support for Venezuela now arriving 
mainly from Russia and China. Instead of the earlier emphasis on popular representation, the 
power struggle appears to privilege a stronger executive backed by military power. Instead of 
focusing on accomplishments and strategies in the economic and ideological sphere directed 
against neoliberalism (public service, social housing, social equality etc.), the country has 
been increasingly under attack for a lack of democracy. The importance of international 
media can hardly be overestimated. Widely reported shortages are blamed on the inept regime 
rather than on the loss of export income and sanctions, for example. But this international 
media effort leads us to the one complaint we can bring forward regarding Cannon`s rich and 
insightful study. Exactly with regard to the dimension of transnational ideology he fails to 
account for an important factor that helps explaining the surprising continuity, versatility and 
strength of the neoliberal right in Latin America. 
Parapolitical mobilization and transnational political technocracy of the right: think 
tank networks
6
 
The central position of key aspects of neoliberalism, namely support for private 
property, freedom of contract, free market and free trade has been duly noted in many 
accounts comparing quite diverse countries and right wing parties that can otherwise differ in 
a range of political questions related to issues like diversity and indigenous rights, religion or 
family (Becker, 2019). In Latin America, Cannon does suggest that ideological regimes 
“…are controlled through highly concentrated and oligopolized media ownership structures 
which show heavy editorial bias in favor of maintaining the neoliberal status quo.” Cannon 
goes on claiming that “[n]etworks of neoliberal think tanks … are found throughout the 
region often established with financial support from transnational organizations” (Cannon, 
                                                          
6
 The following survey of five neoliberal think tank networks in Latin America is based on the most recent 
information available on the web sites of the respective organizations (as of May 2019). The subsequent analysis 
of the individuals involved in all the think tanks (staff and board members, CEOs) instead is based on our dataset 
on the individuals from 2016. It was not possible to update the larger dataset for this article, unfortunately. The 
different count of think tanks in the various networks is due to this time lag. 
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2016, p. 59). While he supplies interesting data on media ownership in Chile, Columbia, 
México and Peru including foreign capital (from Spain in particular), he remains at the 
national level except for mentioning the RELIAL network (Liberal Network of Latin America) 
(Cannon, 2016, p. 70).  
The RELIAL network was founded in 2004 with the help of the German Friedrich 
Naumann Foundation for Liberty and maintains an office in Mexico City. It is a network 
related to liberal political parties, which are historically rather weak in Latin America. In 
addition to five political parties, 35 think tanks are part of the network
7
. But Cannon is 
missing a whole range of neoliberal networks that have been set up earlier than RELIAL, and 
need to be considered when talking about the forces in defense of and promoting 
neoliberalism. Also, while Cannon mentions the Catholic Church and Opus Dei in particular 
in the case of Peru (ibid.), he does not speak about these organizations in the other countries.
8
 
The account falls way short of a presentation of the transnational dimension of think tank 
networks in Latin America, which we can speak about next (compare Fischer and Plehwe, 
2017).  
  The Atlas Economic Research Foundation, in short Atlas Network, is the largest 
neoliberal think tank network operating around the globe, and the second largest trans-
regional network of organized neoliberalism on the Latin American continent. Since its 
foundation in 1981, Atlas has launched or nurtured some 495 institutions in over 90 countries 
worldwide, including 85 think tanks in Latin America and the Caribbean.
9
 The Virginia based 
                                                          
7
 See <http://www.relial.org/> (29-03-2019).  
8
 Conservative Catholics and elements of catholic social teaching such as subsidiarity were important forces 
behind the Pinochet dictatorship in Chile, for example. Jaime Guzmán, one of the intellectual leaders and the 
architect of the legal and constitutional framework of the military regime (which was largely kept in place after 
the transition to democracy) based his ideological project on corporatist ideas, anti-statism and ultraconservative 
Catholic values. Rather atypical for adherents to corporatism, he defended capitalism – and Catholicism helped 
him to argue this ideological amalgam: In the social doctrine formulated by Pope John XXIII, Guzmán perceived 
private property rights and private enterprise as timeless and permanent values. Guzmán strongly invoked the 
principle of subsidiarity that is held to protect families and communities from interference by state authority. He 
thus shared the anti-etatism and references to self-organization with neoliberal perspectives (Fischer, 2009; 
Romero and Bustamante, 2016). Subsidiarity is a subject of intensive discussion among the new right in Chile 
(Ortúzar, 2015). Beside the Chileans, the longtime head of the Heritage foundation, the catholic Ed Feulner, 
Robert Sirico, whose Acton Institute is dedicated to the fusion of catholic teaching and neoliberal political 
thought, and Latin American neoliberals like Alejandro Chafuen from Argentina, himself a member of Opus dei, 
are important leads in a closer investigation of the catholic element of neoliberalism (compare Stolowicz, 2016, 
vol. 1, pp. 153f.). 
9
 See Global Directory and members in Latin America and the Caribbean at 
<https://www.atlasnetwork.org/partners/global-directory> (21-03-2019). 
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Foundation functions like an umbrella organisation. On the one hand, Atlas provides think 
tank entrepreneurs with significant sums of start-up money and advice and connects them 
with donors. On the other hand, Atlas integrates its members through joint events, e.g. the 
Regional Liberty Forums, travel grants, and awards. Moreover, Atlas enhanced the 
professional character of think tank activities and personnel by developing leadership training 
programs and an MBA course for think tank executives. Most of the think tanks under study 
now count on a solid and academic, often foreign trained management team (Djelic, 2017; 
Fischer, 2018). 
  Atlas overlaps with further transnational think tank networks in Latin America or – 
put another way – Atlas has members that are themselves networkers. One of them and at the 
same time the largest is the Hispanic American Center forEconomic Research (HACER), 
established in 1996 and located in Washington DC. HACER focuses on the Hispanic 
Americans in North and South America. 108 think tanks belong to HACER, 89 of them in 
Latin America, seven in Spain and 12 in the U.S. – all of them dedicated to “the core values 
of personal and economic liberty, limited government under the rule of law, and individual 
responsibility”.10 HACER takes a “regional”– as opposed to a country-specific – perspective 
to these issues. Atlas president Alejandro Chafuen serves on the board, among others. 
HACER‟s Latin American News section provides country reports, news and public policy 
papers, distributed in English and Spanish. In an extensive online library HACER offers 
neoliberal classics in Spanish from authors like Ayn Rand, Mises, Menger and Hayek as well 
as contemporary literature from neoliberal thinkers from the continent like Peru‟s Mario 
Vargas Llosa, Cuban-born Carlos Alberto Montaner and Carlos Sabino from Venezuela. The 
organization also awards funding to political leaders and writers, e.g. through its Giancarlo 
Ibargüen Freedom Award named after HACER`s long-standing board member, president of 
the Francisco Marroquín University in Guatemala City and member of the Mont Pèlerin 
Society (MPS), the global network of neoliberal intellectuals founded by Hayek and others in 
1947 (Plehwe and Walpen, 2006; Mirowski and Plehwe, 2009). 
  Another trans-regional network, the Fundación Internacional para la Libertad 
(FIL/International Foundation for Liberty), emerged on initiative of the Spanish right. It was 
founded in 2003 in Madrid, when think tanks from Latin America, Europe and the U.S. came 
together on initiative of the Fundación Iberoamérica Europa, a think tank strongly linked to 
                                                          
10
 See the list of complete list of allied think tanks <http://www.hacer.org/chico-1/> (21-03-2019). 
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José Aznar and the Partido Popular. FIL is headquartered in Rosario, Argentina, and the 
writer and public intellectual Mario Vargas Llosa leads the organization. The academic board 
assembles neoliberal economists from three continents. We find key figures such as Alberto 
Benegas Lynch and Ricardo López from Argentina, Carlos Sabino and a strong Chilean 
fraction (Büchi, Cáceres, and Fontaine). Many of them are MPS members. FIL´s 
entrepreneur`s advisory board comprises more than 50 representatives of big business in Latin 
America and Spain, coordinated by Álvaro Vargas Llosa, like his father a writer and 
neoliberal propagandist. Currently the FIL network comprises of 24 Latin American think 
tanks; US and European (all Spanish except the German Naumann Foundation) organisations 
are equally represented (each with six).
11
 
  The fifth and final transnational think tank network we discovered is Latinoamérica 
Libre. It is the “counterpart” of RELIAL and unites the followers and supporting institutions 
of the Unión de Partidos Latinoamericanos (UPLA). UPLA is the regional spin-off of the 
International Democrat Union which was founded by Margret Thatcher, George Bush, and 
Helmut Kohl, among others. Both, the party and the think tank network are headquartered in 
Santiago de Chile. UPLA currently increases in significance. It gathers 20 reactionary right-
wing parties that are linked to former dictatorships, traditional conservative parties, and new 
parties and movements from the (neoliberal) right. Party members include the far-right 
ARENA (Alianza Republicana Nacionalista) from El Salvador, Chile‟s Renovación Nacional 
and Unión Demócrata Independiente and recent formations like Mauricio Macri`s PRO 
(Propuesta Republicana) from Argentina, the Movimiento CREO from Ecuador or the 
Movimiento Demócrata Social from Bolivia. In sum 17 Latin American think tanks are part 
of the think tank network; it receives international support from the German Hanns Seidel 
Foundation and the International Republican Institute.
12  
The following graph represents the five networks (based on data from 2016).Think 
tanks are represented only if they belong to at least two of the five networks, reducing the 
number from 105 to 55 organizations. This highlights the transnational dimension and allows 
focusing on the organizational integration of the Latin American think tank networks. 
 
                                                          
11
 See <https://fundacionfil.org/consejo-academico/>, <https://fundacionfil.org/consejo-empresario-asesor/> and 
<https://fundacionfil.org/entidades-adheridas/> (20-03-2019). 
12
 See <http://uplalatinoamerica.org/> (20-03-2019). 
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Diagram 1: Think Tanks affiliated to more than one of the five Networks in Latin 
America 
 
Source: thinknetworkresearch.net; we are grateful to Ramona Almen and Moritz Neujeffski who have 
supplied the network graph. 
While the think tanks in the five networks studied are united in general by a normative 
world view, individual think tanks perform quite different tasks. There are think tanks that 
produce and popularize “pure doctrine” and keep some distance from concrete politics. Good 
examples in this regard are those who base their “war of ideas” on the Austrian school of 
Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek. Others are public policy oriented “do tanks”, which 
engage in consultancy and still others go beyond intellectual activities. This is especially true 
for the “freedom fighters” in Brazil that sparked the cultural war against the Worker`s party 
and left-wing intellectuals. Atlas-affiliated groups like Come to the Street (Vem Pra 
Rua/VPR), Students for Liberty (Estudantes Pela Liberdade/EPL) and the Free Brazil 
Movement (Movimento Brasil Livre/MBL) successfully converted the 2013 street 
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demonstrations into marches against Dilma. Their bloggers, columnists and Facebook 
campaigners have themselves garnered a mass of supporters, using violent rhetoric, 
defamation and fake news. Social media, high-circulation Veja magazine, private radio and 
television shows became the platform for aggressive, young freedom fighters many of whom 
went through leadership courses and several training programs at Atlas. Fábio Ostermann, the 
coordinator of the Free Brazil Moment, was a Summer Fellow at the Atlas Economic 
Research Foundation, for example (Amaral, 2015).
13
 
Altogether they form a neoliberal think tank universe which is characterized by quite 
common forms of division of labor among these groups. What Bailey stated in 1965 is still 
accurate: “Whereas one society will be activists, engaging in civic action, pressure tactics, 
and/or direct action against the enemies, another group will be concerned with propaganda 
and education.” (Bailey, 1965, p. 201) They share common principles such as limited 
government, low taxes, individual freedom, free enterprise and the rule of law; their common 
bogeyman is “populism” and the pink tide governments, being built up to be “a communist 
threat”. 
Cadres of neoliberal mobilization 
Studying the organizations populating the various think tank networks leads us to the 
most important assets: the cadres of organized neoliberalism. Studying think tank networks 
allows us to study other important elements of organized neoliberal civil society both in the 
different countries and across borders. Because neoliberalism is a global movement we can 
also benefit from comparing the ways neoliberal networks are organized in other world 
regions. Due to the large number of individuals involved in the transnational neoliberal think 
tank networks, both qualitative and quantitative research has to meet considerable challenges. 
We focus here on individuals who link think tanks across borders and thereby form the 
nucleus of transnational neoliberal elite. This work on think tank professionals and 
(transnational) civil society formation is presently still at an early stage. But the focus on 
think tanks can help us to understand the larger (neoliberal) coalitions of business, media, and 
academic, political and other civil society forces. If these coalitions align, they form 
(transnational) expert, consulting and lobby or advocacy networks (on TECLANs compare 
                                                          
13
 For instructive case studies on the role and relevance of individual neoliberal think tanks and think tank 
networks in Peru, Chile and Argentina see Mitchell, Tim (2009), Fischer (2009) and Plehwe (2011), for example 
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Plehwe, 2014). Think Tank analysis allows tracking and tracing individuals from the various 
fields important to the sources of power who are all invested in think tank politics as staff 
members or in supporting and funding functions on advisory or supervisory boards. The five 
Latin American networks studied comprise of more than 1,300 individuals (compare table 1 
for details). 
Table 1: Think Tanks and their affiliates within the five networks 
TT Networks Nr. of think-tank 
Members 
(international) 
Nr. of think-tank Members 
(Latin-America only)* 
Nr. of individuals 
affiliated** 
Atlas Network 485 ***63 770 
FIL 37 24 387 
HACER 88 61 986 
Latinamericano Libre 14 10 88 
RELIAL 33 27 329 
Total 657 185 (105) 2560 (1352) 
* Think-tanks are often part of more than one network. Therefore, if think-tank membership per network is counted we derive 
at 185 think-tanks positions, which are composed by 105 individual think-tanks.  
** This is true for the individual affiliates as well. There are 1352 individual persons in total, which are affiliated to the 105 
think-tanks. If counted per network, they make up for 2560 positions. 
*** Atlas currently lists 83 think tanks in Latin America, 20 more than 2016, our last update of staff, board members and 
CEOs. 
 
 Contrasting Latin America to Europe helps to shed more light on the local relevance 
of think tank networks in Latin America and on the peculiar composition of transnational 
neoliberal elites. Latin American neoliberal think tank networks appear to be more durable 
and cut more strongly across political party boundaries than European networks, for example 
(Fischer and Plehwe, 2017). Interesting differences emerge if we take a closer look at staff 
and board members. 
 If we count the individuals who are engaged in these five think tank networks in 
Latin America, we arrive at a total of 1352 individuals, comprising staff and board members 
(research on staff and board members last updated in October 2016). Staff members are think 
tank professionals who devote much if not all of their career to think tank efforts. Board 
members are members of advisory boards or supervisory boards. They usually come either 
from the academic world or from corporations, although some can also hold jobs in the media 
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or hold political offices. Think tank staff and board members are often affiliated to more than 
one think tank, they make up for 1517 positions,
14
 though less than ten percent of the staff and 
board members hold multiple positions.  
Common to both regions is the phenomenon of interlocking think tank positions held 
by 106 individuals (of the total of 1352 individuals affiliated to the 105 think tanks) in Latin 
America and 149 individuals in Europe. Interlocking positions can be held by board and by 
staff members. Of the 106 individuals who held positions in at least two think tanks in Latin 
America, 37 held positions in at least two think tanks in different countries (51 in Europe). 
The latter group in particular is of considerable interest since we can assume these people to 
be important intermediaries between the different national constellations. Let us take a closer 
look at this nucleus of transnational neoliberal elites in Latin America. 
The top members of the 37 hold up to 9 positions in different think tanks. The group is 
led by Carlos Sabino. His career brought the Argentina-born MPS member and prolific writer 
to neoliberal academic bastions in Venezuela, Guatemala (Francisco Marroquín University) 
and to the US (George Mason University). Second is Alberto Benegas Lynch and Gerardo 
Bongiovanni, both are also academic power brokers from Argentina. Benegas Lynch is the 
founder of the ESEADE Business School in Buenos Aires, Bongiovanni initiated Fundación 
Libertad, Fundación Iberoamérica Europa and Fundación Internacional para la Libertad. 
Among the top ten linkers we furthermore find the exiled Cuban writer Carlos Alberto 
Montaner and Alejandro Chafuen, long-time head of the Atlas Economic Research 
Foundation network also from Argentina. Following his career at Atlas, Chafuen moved to 
the important catholic neoliberal think tank Acton Institute in 2018. The list also includes 
Peru‟s think tank scholar Enrique Ghersi and Alvaro Vargas Llosa, son of Peruvian novelist 
Mario Vargas Llosa, and Cato-affiliated Ian Vásquez, who served at the U.S. Council on 
Foreign Relations and is an MPS member. The only woman among the top ten is antichavista 
Rocío Guijarro, co-founder of one of the oldest and most active think tanks on the continent, 
CEDICE in Venezula. 
                                                          
14
 In our chapter “Neoliberal think tank networks in Latin America and Europe: strategic replication and cross 
national organizing” (Fischer and Plehwe, 2017) we speak of 3384 positions. This discrepancy results from two 
factors. (1) a different calculation, in which positions are counted per network: Since many think-tanks hold 
membership in more than one network, this results in different numbers of positions. (2) We have also included 
think tanks in these five Latin-American networks, which are based outside Latin-America. The numbers 
provided here focus on Latin America only and count think tanks that are part of different networks only once.  
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Biorgraphical analysis reveals further details about the transnational neoliberal elite 
members. We discover a high number of members of the Mont Pèlerin Society: 51 % of these 
transnational linkers take part in the global neoliberal elite network. Apart from a high 
number of interlocks held by MPS members in general, MPS members clearly outnumber 
others when it comes to occupying positions in three or more think tanks. We therefore 
consider them a key element of transnational neoliberal knowledge power elites in C. Wright 
Mill‟s sense of occupying organizational leadership positions. 
  If we take a closer look at the groups of MPS and non-MPS members who are in 
interlock positions across borders, we can establish some interesting descriptive particulars 
for transnational elite members. Correspondence analysis is helpful to establish association 
between categorical variables in a given dataset and singles out different “types” of actors. 
Contrasting Latin American and European neoliberal elites (sub-divided by MPS membership 
and the group of non-members) helps realizing the specificities of the Latin American Think 
Tank networkers. 
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Diagram 2: Correspondence Analysis – Macro-Region and MPS/nonMPS-Membership 
with Main Employment 
 
The corresponding results are listed in the annex (Table 2) 
In contrast to Europe, Latin American members of the Mont Pèlerin Society are 
working for think tanks rather than universities, and those interlocking board members who 
are not part of the MPS network are closer to the media and think tank field compared to the 
Europeans who are closer to the business and think tank field. Compared to Europe, the 
transnational cadres of neoliberal networks are more closely based in the ideological sphere of 
think tanks and the media. 
  In terms of training, we also find interesting differences between organized 
neoliberals in Latin America and in Europe. The following graph shows the members of the 
interlocking communities placed in the field of academic and professional training. 
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Diagram 3: Correspondence Analysis – Continent and MPS-Membership with 
Educational Background 
 
The corresponding results are listed in the annex (Table 3) 
European MPS members in interlocking positions are typically economists. The 
profile of Latin American neoliberal intellectuals is more diverse. In addition to economists 
we also find more traditional fields like history or literature.
 
 The proportion of women is low 
in the inner circle, in Latin America it is slightly higher (13.5%) than in Europe (12%). In 
terms of country of origin, the biggest group of transnational cadres is from Argentina 
followed by Peru and Chile. Although their space of activity is of course transnational, only a 
small group has moved their place of activity elsewhere or abroad. 
  How important are these networks? When many of the right expressed fears in the 
advent of Lula‟s rise to the presidency in Brazil, the head of the Atlas Economic Research 
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Foundation, Alejandro Chafuen, countered the worries with a table compiled to document the 
strength of the neoliberal civil society organizations in his world region (see diagram 4). 
Diagram 4: Neoliberal Capacity Building: MPS Latin America Think Tanks 
 
Source: Chafuen, 2006, p. 6, based on estimates from Atlas Economic Research database and 
www.hacer.org 
 
Commenting on the pink tide, the mentor of the freedom fighters in Brazil said: “And 
after 25 years of Atlas investing in the region, we have many more think tanks, universities 
and media outlets championing the principles of the free society. The prospects for Latin 
America to rebuild their institutions in a manner favorable to liberty are quite strong, 
especially if our think tank allies can continue to move beyond narrow research and familiar 
audiences (…).” (Chafuen, 2006, p. 1) In addition to the need to observe the right wing 
political parties in opposition it is clearly necessary to pay closer attention to neoliberal civil 
society networks in Latin America. 
Conclusion: the limits of the pink tide and the prospect of “post-neoliberalism” 
In this article we are siding with those who have argued that the “pink tide” has been a 
contested process rather than a break with neoliberalism (Chodor, 2015). Although the term 
can be useful it needs to become much clearer where and how economic, political and social 
relations develop in ways that allow speaking about a departure from neoliberalism rather 
7 
10 
5 35 40 12 7 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
Free-market think
tanks
Universities with
free-market
champions
Free-market journals
and magazines
Free-market radio/TV
programs
1975
2005
 
Revista de Estudos e Pesquisas sobre as Américas V.13 N.2 2019 ISSN: 1984-1639 
 
192 
than evolution under considerable if not overarching influence of neoliberal social forces and 
principles let alone the structural constraints, domestic and international.  
Drawing on a revised version of Michael Mann‟s model of social power we relied on 
Barry Cannon‟s (2016) work to demonstrate the limits of the departure from neoliberalism in 
political-institutional, economic, ideological and military terms. Contrary to the emphasis on 
political shifts by scholars advocating the intertwined development of the pink tide and post-
neoliberalism, we have argued the need for a deeper analysis of different socio-economic and 
ideological dimensions and the wider distribution of power in capitalist societies. The pink 
tide movement ultimately failed to fundamentally contradict, confront and undermine 
neoliberal varieties of capitalist development in Latin America in all but a few countries or 
domains. Institutional reforms were often the result of opportunities rather than the result of a 
systematic effort and only pursued in a given period of time when the international conditions 
were favorable.  
Even the most ambitious Bolivarian countries and to a lesser extent Argentina and 
Brazil failed to deepen and institutionalize a new “post-neoliberal” model. This also applies to 
the international level. South-South cooperation in the framework of ALBA, UNASUR and 
the Latin American Investment Bank stalled, and has recently been undermined by the new 
phalanx of right wing governments committed to rescinding the Bolivarian revolution. Instead 
of ALBA‟s focus on south-south cooperation, the Pacific Alliance model of corporate 
globalization and partnership with the North once again tops the agenda. “Productive 
integration”, caught up with difficulties in any case, is off the table. Industrial strategies will 
be limited to upgrading efforts within global value chains. 
Taking the argument of the need to take the transnational sources of power further our 
analysis of transnational think tank networks and neoliberal elites in Latin America shows the 
extent to which these networks have been developed across borders. The extent to which 
neoliberals in different countries, political parties, corporate headquarters, churches and other 
civil society organizations rely on the input originating in neoliberal think tank and expert 
networks can hardly be over-estimated. At the same time it is necessary to recognize that a lot 
of research remains to be done. We still need to know much more about the funding of think 
tanks, about the profile of the think tank professionals and their leadership, and about the 
range of tasks carried out by these para-political cadres. Links to both the media, to the 
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corporate sector and to other civil society organizations like the churches in particular need to 
be examined more closely in order to more fully comprehend the track laying capacities and 
the variety of catholic neoliberalism in Latin America (compare Fischer and Plehwe, 2013).  
The closer look at nucleus of the transnational neoliberal elite underlines the relevance of 
think tank networks in Latin America. Much more can be found out in greater detail once we, 
firstly, expand the group biographical analysis of think tank professionals to the larger group 
of individuals who are present in more than one think tanks, and, secondly, to the whole goup 
of individuals serving as staff and board members. A more comprehensive study of board 
members in particular will help to shed light on components of the neoliberal discourse 
coalitions and expert, consulting and lobby or advocacy networks beyond the think tanks, 
namely the corporate, media, civil society and party political elements.  
In terms of ideological change, the new varieties of neoliberalism under construction 
in the present time combine key tenets of economic freedom with social and cultural 
conservatism, including more pronounced nationalism. Conservative catholic social norms 
like personality, solidarity in extended family and community circles and subsidiarity are of 
particular relevance in this regard. In terms of policy making, the populist mask is quickly 
taken off and offers plain visibility of the radicalized neoliberal content of the new right wing 
formations as we can see in the case of Brazil or Venezuela. The softer varieties claiming 
social market economy professing liberal values with regard to gender, sexuality, diversity 
etc. are meeting the objections of the more authoritarian varieties that combine neoliberalism 
and social and cultural conservatism. In Chile, for example, different fractions of young 
neoliberal intellectuals set out to build a program for a renewed right for Chile and beyond. 
Newly founded think tanks and a lively stream of publications substantiate this endeavor in 
which communitarian, cosmopolitan and authoritarian currents confront one another (Alenda, 
Gartenlaub and Fischer, 2019).  
Neoliberal core beliefs like property rights, freedom of contract, rule of law and the 
need to defend and stabilize the capitalist order have been translated in different programs and 
models depending on socio-economic circumstances, power constellations and social 
struggles. Neoliberals are willing to compromise with their opponents if need be, but the 
threats emanating from countries like Venezuela, Argentina or Brazil also demonstrate the 
range of counter-strategies employed to defend the basic tenets of neoliberal order. Counter 
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strategies involved mobilizations that relied on media channels and think tank infrastructures 
in addition to party political, electoral and legal strategies. Beyond legal strategies, the right 
pushed new targeting and defamation strategies, which prepared the ground for semi-
constitutional action (e.g. one-sided anti-corruption campaigns), which require significant 
support from media and media behind the media, namely coordinated campaigns via think 
tank networks, for example. Instead of focusing only or mainly on the left or on the right, a 
relational perspective is required to assess the process of contentious politics and the 
direction of social transformations.  
To take a relational perspective serious also means analyzing the frictions and 
divisions within the right and the “limits of the possible”. New right wing governments across 
the regions will remain extremely vulnerable to the volatility of the global commodity 
markets. Progressive forces across Latin America are called upon to engage (again) in an 
ideological battle in order to reflect and possibly re-direct social struggles. Progressive think 
tanks, transnationally coordinated, might come to play a role here. 
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Continuity and Variety of Neoliberalism: Reconsidering Latin America‟s Pink Tide 
Abstract:  
In this article we critically engage with the term and concept of “post-neoliberalism”, delineate 
different meanings in the literature and arrive at the conclusion that the term leaves more questions 
open than it answers. In order to clarify the continuity and variety of neoliberalism in Latin America, 
we draw on literature that investigates the departure from and the persistence of neoliberalism. Barry 
Cannon`s work on the rise of the right in Latin America can be considered particularly useful to 
carefully study both social power relations within the various countries, and international power 
relations of great relevance to the region. In taking his arguments further we present and examine 
transnational neoliberal think tank networks that are active in Latin America in comparative 
perspective. We show the extent to which these networks have been developed across borders and 
investigate the key linkers within these networks. In comparison with European neoliberal networks, 
the role of think tank professionals as transnational coordinators stands out. In conclusion we situate 
the main neoliberal currents within the contemporary constellation of right wing political ideologies. 
The article strengthens a relational perspective in the study of varieties of neoliberalism and its 
counter-forces. Last but not least research desiderata are indicated with regard to think tank 
professionals and organized civil society and in the field of historical institutionalism related to the 
rise of transnational ideological power structures at large.   
Keywords: varieties of neoliberalism, pink tide, post-neoliberalism, think tanks networks.  
 
Continuidad y variedad del neoliberalismo: reconsiderando la marea rosada de América 
Latina 
Resumen:  
En este artículo nos comprometemos críticamente con el término y el concepto de 
"posneoliberalismo", delineamos diferentes utilizaciones en la literatura y llegamos a la conclusión de 
que el término deja más preguntas abiertas que contestadas. Por lo tanto, recurrimos a la literatura que 
investiga la desviación (o la persistencia) del neoliberalismo en un estudio cuidadoso de las relaciones 
de poder social. Más concretamente, nos basamos en el trabajo de Barry Cannon sobre el auge de la 
derecha en América Latina. Al profundizar sus argumentos, examinamos, desde una perspectiva 
comparativa, redes transnacionales de think tanks neoliberales que están activas en América Latina. 
Mostramos hasta qué punto estas redes se han desarrollado a través de las fronteras e investigamos los 
actores clave dentro de estas redes. En comparación con redes neoliberales en Europa destaca el papel 
de los profesionales de los think tanks como coordinadores transnacionales. Para concluir, situamos 
las corrientes principales dentro de la constelación contemporánea de ideologías políticas de derecha. 
El artículo fortalece una perspectiva relacional en el estudio del neoliberalismo y sus fuerzas opuestas. 
Por último, indicamos desiderata de investigación en el campo de los profesionales de think tanks 
como actores de la sociedad civil y de las estructuras de poder ideológico transnacional en general. 
Palabras clave: variedades de neoliberalismo, marea rosa, post-neoliberalismo, redes de 
think tanks. 
Continuidade e Variedade do Neoliberalismo: Reconsiderando a Onda Rosa da América 
Latina 
Resumo:  
No presente artigo, debatemos críticamente a expressão e o conceito de pós-neolibaralismo. Ao 
delinear diferentes utilizações na literatura, chegamos à conclusão deixa mais perguntas do que 
respostas. Neste sentido, recorremos à literatura que investiga o desvio (ou persistência) do 
neoliberalismo em um estudo cuidadoso das relações de poder social. Mais especificamente, nos 
baseamos no trabalho de Barry Cannon sobre o auge da direita da América Latina. Ao aprofundar seus 
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argumentos, analisamos, desde uma perspectiva comparativa, as redes transnacionais de think tanks 
neoliberais que estão ativas na América Latina. Mostramos até que ponto estas redes se 
desenvolveram por meio das fronteiras e analisamos os atores chave dentro destas redes. Em 
comparação com as redes neoliberais da Europa, o artigo destaca o papel dos profissionais dos think 
tanks como coordenadores transnacionais. Para concluir, situamos as correntes principais dentro da 
constelação contemporânea de ideologias políticas de direita. O artigo fortalece uma abordagem 
relacional no estudo do neoliberalismo e das suas forças opostas. Por fim, apontamos a necessidade de 
uma pesquisa no campo dos profissionais de think tanks como atores da sociedade civil e das 
estruturas de poder ideológico transnacional em geral. 
Palavras-chave: variedades de neoliberalismo, maré-rosa, pós-neoliberalismo, redes de think 
tanks. 
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Annex: 
Table 2: Correspondence Analysis – Continent and MPS-Membership with Main 
Employment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Statistics for row and column categories in symmetric normalization
          total                 .4086471          35.55     100
                                                                             
          dim 3     .1152071    .0132727           1.15       3.25    100.00
          dim 2     .3568486    .1273409          11.08      31.16     96.75
          dim 1     .5177196    .2680336          23.32      65.59     65.59
                                                                             
      Dimension      value       inertia           chi2    percent   percent 
                    singular    principal                             cumul  
    4 active columns                          Expl. inertia (%)  =      96.75
    6 active rows                             Number of dim.     =          2
                                              Total inertia      =     0.4086
                                              Prob > chi2        =     0.0021
                                              Pearson chi2(15)   =      35.55
Correspondence analysis                       Number of obs      =         87
    NON-MPS-La~n     0.207    0.984    0.346    -1.034    0.811    0.427     0.574    0.172    0.191 
    NON-MPS-Eu~e     0.333    0.995    0.378     0.914    0.933    0.538     0.286    0.063    0.076 
       MPS-Latin     0.218    0.432    0.043    -0.222    0.319    0.021     0.159    0.113    0.015 
      MPS-Europe     0.241    0.996    0.234    -0.175    0.040    0.014    -1.030    0.956    0.717 
    Cont_Member                                                                                      
                                                                                                     
      University     0.322    0.990    0.152    -0.065    0.011    0.003    -0.728    0.979    0.478 
      Think Tank     0.414    0.943    0.111    -0.403    0.768    0.130     0.232    0.175    0.062 
        Politics     0.080    0.992    0.081     0.851    0.911    0.113    -0.304    0.080    0.021 
           Media     0.011    0.780    0.108    -1.998    0.539    0.089     1.608    0.241    0.083 
      Literature     0.034    1.000    0.140    -1.474    0.679    0.145     1.220    0.321    0.144 
        Business     0.138    1.000    0.409     1.399    0.838    0.522     0.741    0.162    0.212 
    MainJobs                                                                                         
                                                                                                     
      Categories      mass  quality   %inert     coord   sqcorr  contrib     coord   sqcorr  contrib 
                            overall                   dimension_1                 dimension_2        
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Table 3: Correspondence Analysis – Continent and MPS-Membership with Educational 
Background 
 
 
Statistics for row and column categories in symmetric normalization
          total                 .2669129          23.22     100
                                                                             
          dim 3     .1886889    .0356035           3.10      13.34    100.00
          dim 2     .2522289    .0636194           5.53      23.84     86.66
          dim 1     .4094997      .16769          14.59      62.83     62.83
                                                                             
      Dimension      value       inertia           chi2    percent   percent 
                    singular    principal                             cumul  
    4 active columns                          Expl. inertia (%)  =      86.66
    7 active rows                             Number of dim.     =          2
                                              Total inertia      =     0.2669
                                              Prob > chi2        =     0.1822
                                              Pearson chi2(18)   =      23.22
Correspondence analysis                       Number of obs      =         87
                                                                                                     
    NON-MPS-La~n     0.207    0.802    0.238     0.661    0.583    0.221    -0.517    0.220    0.220 
    NON-MPS-Eu~e     0.333    0.932    0.266    -0.619    0.736    0.312    -0.407    0.196    0.219 
       MPS-Latin     0.218    0.849    0.289     0.811    0.763    0.350     0.346    0.086    0.104 
      MPS-Europe     0.241    0.882    0.207    -0.446    0.355    0.117     0.692    0.527    0.458 
    Cont_Member                                                                                      
                                                                                                     
    Social Sci~s     0.276    0.986    0.039     0.068    0.050    0.003    -0.374    0.936    0.153 
      Management     0.034    1.000    0.112    -0.469    0.104    0.019    -1.759    0.896    0.423 
             Law     0.057    0.567    0.052     0.522    0.460    0.038    -0.320    0.107    0.023 
         History     0.046    0.577    0.130     1.030    0.577    0.119     0.003    0.000    0.000 
       Economics     0.506    0.999    0.174    -0.377    0.633    0.176     0.365    0.366    0.267 
    Computer S~e     0.011    0.795    0.086    -1.511    0.468    0.064    -1.612    0.328    0.118 
         sysmiss     0.069    0.908    0.406     1.858    0.899    0.581     0.231    0.009    0.015 
    Studies                                                                                          
                                                                                                     
      Categories      mass  quality   %inert     coord   sqcorr  contrib     coord   sqcorr  contrib 
                            overall                   dimension_1                 dimension_2        
